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The Economics of Badmouthing:
Libel Law and the Underworld of the 
Financial Press in France Before World War I 
VINCENT BIGNON AND MARC FLANDREAU
This article analyzes the economics of “badmouthing” in the context of the pre-
1914 French capital market. We argue that badmouthing was a means through 
which racketeering journals sought to secure property rights over issuers’ 
reputation. We provide a theoretical study of the market setup that emerged to 
deal with such problems, and we test our predictions using new evidence from 
contemporary sources. 
“A newspaper that wishes to make its fortune should never waste its columns 
and weary its readers by praising anything. Eulogy is invariably dull—a fact that 
Mr. Alf had discovered and utilized.” 
A. Trollope, The Way We Live Now, 1875 
“And did you threaten him with the newspapers?” 
H. de Balzac, La maison Nucingen, 1837 
enjamin Franklin wrote that “glass, china, and reputation are easily 
cracked and never well mended.”Anyone with a brand or public 
name is concerned with the costs of denigration by the press, because 
reputation is a source of rents. Libel laws exist to protect reputation, 
but—by the time compensation is obtained—irrecoverable losses have 
been incurred. False allegations linger despite efforts to publicize  
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any court rulings that the libeled party may have secured. Papers thus 
have claims on a security issuer’s reputation, because reputation is 
pretty much what the press makes of it. This externality cannot be  
easily addressed or insured against, given the built-in moral hazard. 
Furthermore, there is a trade-off between libel law and freedom of 
speech. Full freedom of speech gives more people the opportunity to 
speak the truth; but this also creates the problems described here as it 
becomes harder to secure protection from being denigrated. 
 “Badmouthing” here covers the threat to print negative things (for 
extortion purposes) as well as the implementation of such threats. 
Indeed because reputation is valuable, it is possible to turn badmouthing 
into a racket. Faced with the threat of badmouthing victims are tempted 
to pay to prevent damaging rumors from circulating. Badmouthing is 
easy. It is based on making things up and threatening to publish them. 
Because they have a readership, newspapers are well positioned to 
promote such fabrication. They need not actually make allegations 
(since these could run afoul of libel law); rather, a paper need only 
imply, suggest, or let it be understood that something is wrong and let 
the rumor grow. Many racketeering cases do not need involve open 
accusations. When a borrower comes under threat, some newspapers 
can suspend reporting on it. Concern is then communicated by lack of 
coverage. The “embargoed” firms have an incentive to approach 
newspapers about actually paying for coverage. Badmouthing is also 
hard to curb in a society where freedom of speech prevails, since it is 
hard to distinguish from the free expression of negative views. 
 Some situations are especially conducive to such problems: firms 
issuing new securities, experiencing financial difficulties, or selling 
risky technology are easy targets. Detection of badmouthing is difficult 
because payoffs can take many different and legal forms: as soon as 
some media is responsible with providing information, the problem can 
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arise. Historically, a frequent target of accusations of “badmouthing” is 
the rating agencies (although at a broader level, the matter is a recurrent 
one with the financial press at large). This began with criticism of  
the agencies’ nineteenth-century American forerunners (the “mercantile 
agencies”), which were sometimes charged with the accusation that 
firms who refused to subscribe would receive poor ratings.2 Recently, 
Hannover Re (a German insurer) charged that Moody’s had tried  
to force it to purchase a rating and that the insurer’s resistance led 
Moody’s to report an unsolicited negative rating (Re claimed that two 
other rating agencies it had employed reported a favorable outlook).3
 How can potential victims manage this problem? We explore how 
market solutions emerged in Paris from 1870 to 1914. While the issues 
raised by badmouthing are general, there are three reasons for choosing 
this setting for our study. First, the Law of 1881 gave the press both free 
speech and free entry.4 Second, the period is usually portrayed as being 
rife with defamatory rackets and related abuses by the press against 
banks, borrowing governments, and firms.5 Graphic and informative 
details can be drawn from a variety of sources including L’humanité
(a communist newspaper). Between December 1923 and March 1924 
it showed how the czar paid nearly 5 million pre-World War I FF 
(1 million pre-World War I USD) to the French press between 1904 and 
1907. Finally, despite badmouthing, the Paris financial market remained 
the second most important international capital market in the world. 
Paris’ market capitalization as a share of GDP was close to 100 percent, 
and Paris competed with London to issue foreign government debt.6
Badmouthing must have been, to some extent, tamed. 
 Other modern papers have examined the impact of a free press on 
corruption and quality.7 In this literature, the press helps by monitoring 
managers and policymakers and by reducing frauds. By assumption, a 
free press tells the truth and reports wrongdoings. Our article takes a 
2 In the words of one observer: “What [mercantile agencies] desire is to drive the man within 
their own in closure, and force him to become a subscriber to their institution.” Brooklyn Eagle,
“Agencies,” 15 November 1873, 2. 
3 Alec Klein, “Credit Raters’ Power Leads to Abuses, Some Borrowers Say,” Washington
Post, 24 November 2004. See also Jennifer Levitz, “Moody’s Sued in Ratings Case,” Wall
Street Journal, 26 March 2009.  
4 Albert, “La presse française.” 
5 Marinitsch, La bourse ; Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses; Mouthon, Bluff au chantage;
Raffalovich Abominable vénalité; Ageron, “La vénalité de la presse française”; and Jeanneney, 
“La vénalité.” 
6 Rajan and Zingales, “Great Reversals.” 
7 Gentzkow, Glaeser, and Goldin, “Rise of the Fourth Estate”; Petrova, “Newspapers and 
Parties”; McMillan and Zoido, “How to Subvert”; Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales, “Corporate 
Governance Role”; Besley and Prat, “Handcuffs”; Gentzkow and Shapiro, “Media Bias”; 
Djankov et al., “Who Owns”; and Baron, “Persistent Media Bias.” 
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different perspective. A free-press regime also complicates the court 
enforcement of libel cases. Thus the current literature deals with truth in 
the market for news, and the risk that true facts remain concealed. We 
are concerned with the risk that false (and harmful) claims circulate. 
Statistical theory shows that there is a relation between the incidence of 
the two problems (known as type I and type II errors). Increasing the 
stringency of libel law (raising the cost of defamation) reduces false 
claims but increases the risk that true claims will not be publicized. In 
this broader context, it may be optimal to tolerate a certain degree of 
defamation. We leave the normative issue of the optimal amount of  
libel punishment aside, and focus on market solutions that contain 
denigration.8
 To understand how the market dealt with the risk of badmouthing, 
we analyze the organization of the French press and discuss instances 
of defamatory racket. We find that certain newspapers specialized 
in disinformation and racketeering. These were the smaller and less 
reputable papers, which we call “bad” or “zombie,” that appeared to 
wage a press campaign only to be discontinued afterwards. Yet since 
they were small and lacked reputation, any one of these bad papers did 
not wield much influence: they were only dangerous when they 
coordinated their attacks. This created an incentive for bad papers to 
become more organized and at the same time, their targets had an 
incentive to organize themselves. We find that, to control the damages 
of badmouthing, corporations, underwriting banks, and governments 
turned to quasi-formal intermediaries, known as “publicity brokers,” 
who acted as delegated monitors (essentially mafia bosses) and replaced 
bilateral sanctions with multilateral, intertemporal ones. 
 Another finding concerns the implications of our theory for newspaper 
revenues. We show that the risk of bad publicity induces targets to 
seek press coverage from more prestigious sources of information.9 As a 
result, space in good papers is scarce, and they can charge information 
providers. Thus the threat of badmouthing may be viewed as the solution 
to the free-rider problem that underlies any provision of high-quality 
information: the noise generated by badmouthing threatens not only 
investors but also borrowers, thus the “good” press enjoys a windfall. 
This analysis can go a long way toward resolving why rating agencies, 
which early on only charged the purchasers of their “manuals,” 
successfully switched to a regime where issuers of securities were also 
8 Garoupa, “Dishonesty”; Bar-Gill and Hamdani “Optimal Liability”; and Dalvi and Refalo, 
“Economic Analysis.” 
9 Modiano, La presse pourrie, p. xi. 
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charged.10 Proposals suggesting that agencies should now switch back to 
the former regime miss an important aspect of the current setup: it is a 
natural market outcome and, in many respects, may be a desirable one.11
 Because of its underground nature, badmouthing has left no 
systematic trace. Using published material and archival evidence, we 
have gathered entirely new data sets. First, we document the evolution 
of the population of financial newspapers in Paris (and London) for the 
period 1870–1913. We rely on so far unexploited yearbooks (such as 
the Catalogue des Journaux Imprimés and the Annuaire de la presse) to 
compute the longevity of the financial weeklies. We also collected 
individual information on newspapers’ periodicity and price per issue. 
For a few sampled newspapers, we also collected the advertising 
surface and the price per line of advertisement to construct an estimate 
of advertising revenues. Using a variety of sources such as leaks in 
newspapers and bank archive, we also gather evidence on actual bribes 
paid for a number of security issues and compare these to other issuance 
costs such as the fees charged by underwriting banks. Finally using 
secondary sources, memoirs by journalists, police reports from archives, 
and a number of other documents, we have striven to paint a complete 
and accurate picture of shadowy organizational features our account 
suggests were important. 
 We begin with the legal background (and contrast it to Great 
Britain’s), provide canonical examples of badmouthing, report statistical 
information, and document the rise of what we call a “zombie press.” 
Section II provides a theory of badmouthing that relies on several 
strands of literature. In the next section, we establish facts that are 
consistent with the predictions underlying our intuitive theory of the 
market for fabricated news. Section IV, finally, provides a positive 
exploration of the costs of badmouthing. Relying on information 
disclosed in the press in several instances of racket, which we matched 
with material from bank archive, we construct estimates of badmouthing 
expenditures. The small numbers we get are consistent with our central 
claim that badmouthing remained subdued. On the other hand, exploring 
the distribution between good and bad outlets, we find evidence of 
nontrivial line losses (a substantial share of money reaching the less 
reputable outlays).  
10 See Cantor and Packer, “Credit Rating Industry”; Smith and Walter, “Rating Agencies”; 
and Byoun and Shin, “Unsolicited Credit Ratings.” For a historical description of rating 
agencies, see Sylla “Primer”; and Flandreau, Gaillard, and Packer, “Rating Agencies.” 
11 A contemporary discussion of feasible charging structures can be found in Raffalovich, 
L’abominable vénalité, p. 207. 
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LIBEL LAW AND BADMOUTHING: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Libel Law and the Era of Journalistic Freedom in France (1871–1914) 
 The period from 1870 to 1914 is usually portrayed as the heyday of 
journalistic freedom in France. Between 1851 and 1870 Napoleon III 
limited the political freedom of the press: censorship controlled news 
content, high stamp duties discouraged entry, and new titles had to  
be officially sanctioned.12 The advent of the Third Republic in 1870 
ushered in a significant liberalization. Supervision was relaxed and 
entry costs were lowered. Pressure by the left-of-center Radicaux led to 
more lenient implementation of libel laws. After this party won the 
elections of 1876, the press was given full freedom in the Law of 1881. 
 The new law’s self-professed aim was to check any executive control 
of the content of newspapers, and it abolished all remaining entry 
barriers.13 A key aspect of the law is that it transferred political libel 
cases from correctionnelle tribunals, which were ruled by professional 
judges who could be influenced by the government, to assises courts 
—that is, popular juries. Historians have emphasized that the new 
statute of 1881 (described as France’s “First Amendment”) encouraged 
a violence of language that was unmatched in other countries.
 Compare now with Britain. There the Campbell Act of 1843 was in 
force and it had a strong anti-badmouthing bias. First, the act punished 
“plain” libel with one year in an ordinary prison. Malicious libels 
(known to be false), could lead to three years’ imprisonment, including 
hard labor. Second, the act explicitly punished threatening to publish a 
libel (or to abstain from publishing anything) with intent to extort with 
forced labor for up to three years.14 Third, the “defense of truth,” which 
allowed defendants to prove their accusation true, could only be 
invoked if publication of the libel was in the “public benefit.” Finally, 
those defendants convicted of libel had to bear the plaintiff’s legal 
expenses.15
 Even under Napoleon III, France was more tolerant of malicious  
libel against corporate interests and the Law of 1881 did not provide  
for higher penalties. Penalties were systematically smaller than those 
prevailing in Britain for a similar tort (up to six months or one year, 
12 Palmer, Des petits journaux; and Albert, “La presse française.” 
13 For a classic discussion, see Albert, “La presse française.” Note that the process had started 
earlier. Judges are said to have anticipated on the new law, providing increasingly softer 
interpretations of existing provisions in the period before 1881. 
14 “An Act to Amend the Law Respecting Defamatory Words and Libel,” CAP. XCVI, Anno
Sexto & Septimo, Victoriae Reginae.
15 See Koss, Rise and Fall, for an account of the British experience. 
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depending on the violation). Moreover, Article 35 of the Law of 1881 
allowed the defense of truth to be used against directors or board 
members of industrial, commercial, or financial enterprises offering 
securities to the public.16 One could thus print any insulting or 
denigrating statement against corporate executives—provided it was 
based on “facts.” Effectively, the law provided no checks on slander.  
 Given this situation, did anyone manage to find solutions to rampant 
badmouthing? Social historians have seen tighter libel laws in Britain  
as leading to the early disappearance of duels in Britain and their 
continuation in France.17 In French literary and political circles, duels 
were used to deal with badmouthing; in fact, some leading newspapers 
had in-house facilities to train for fencing.18 The early years of the 
Annuaire de la presse, the main statistical source for information on 
newspapers, also reported on the “most important duels.” Yet risking 
one’s life to defend a reputation may have been too chivalrous a deed 
for bankers and businessmen. As reported in the Annuaire, they rarely 
dueled, and none were killed.19
 Figure 1 displays the numbers of economic and financial newspapers 
in Paris and London between 1874 and 1913. These numbers offer  
a stark contrast. Our sources for France are the Catalogue des journaux 
imprimés (1875/76), La publicité en France (1878–1880), and the 
Annuaire de la presse (1881–1914).20 Each organizes newspapers by 
subject, and we counted the number of papers listed under finance and 
économie politique (political economy). For England, the Tercentenary 
handlist of English & Welsh newspapers, magazines & reviews lists all 
the periodicals published for at least one year in London between 1620
and 1920.21 Two facts are evident from Figure 1. First, between 1874 and
16 “La vérité des imputations diffamatoires et injurieuses pourra être également établie contre 
les directeurs ou administrateurs de toute entreprise industrielle, commerciale ou financière, 
faisant publiquement appel à l’épargne ou au crédit” (Law of 1881, Article 35). 
17 Simpson, “Dandelions.”  
18 Duels were tolerated, and if conventions were scrupulously respected (number and 
qualification of witnesses, rules for choosing weapons, etc.), killing ones’ opponent did not lead 
to sentences. 
19 The two instances we found in Dujardin’s 1891 Annuaire du duel occurred in 1880 and 
1882. All told, there were 38 duels in 1880 and 58 in 1882. The 1880 duel opposed Arthur 
Meyer, director of Le Gaulois, to the banker Gaston Dreyfus. When Meyer was wounded, the 
fight was stopped. While fighting Dreyfus, Meyer also claimed he had been insulted by Mr. 
Lange (another banker) whom he challenged to a duel. Lange declined as he did not care if he 
was “killed” in the press. 
20 The exact title of the last yearbook was changed twice. Between 1892 and 1905 as 
Annuaire de la presse française et du monde politique, and then as Annuaire de la presse 
française et étrangère et du monde politique.
21 As for London, the source we use did not classified newspapers by specialty and it only listed 
which newspapers appeared each year. To obtain the number of financial periodicals published 
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FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERS SPECIALIZED IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE IN 
FRANCE AND BRITAIN 
Source: Authors’ computations. French Data are from the volumes of the Catalogue des Journaux 
Imprimés (1875, 1877) edited by Gébé, La publicité en France (1878, 1879, 1880) edited by 
Mermet, and the Annuaire de la presse (1881–1914), edited by Mermet (1881–1891), D’Avenel 
(1892–1904/05), and Bluysen (1907–1914). Each volume appeared at the beginning of the year, 
and then reflected the number of newspapers published in December of the preceding year. English 
data are from the Tercentenary Handlist of English and Welsh Newspapers, Magazines, and 
Reviews (1920).  
1880 there was a dramatic increase in French financial media (from about 
67 to about 200). Comparable London media increased more slowly. 
Second, the Paris totals are astonishingly high—around 1900 there were 
more than three times as many newspapers as in London. If Parisians were 
not so passionate about financial news, could it be that not every one of 
the 310 papers of 1913 was a bona fide publication? 
each year, we identified both which papers were in finance and political economy and which were 
(or were not, respectively) in operation in a given year. The source for London required to proceed 
by hand (no journal category given). To establish the finance category, we identified by name and 
through external checks all economics and finance related journals (but excluded insurance 
journals to make it more congruent to the French data). 
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 Anecdotal evidence leans towards the latter explanation. Many Parisian 
papers had pseudo-addresses, existed only episodically, and/or cannot be 
found in any library on earth. Many of those for whom the Bibliothèque 
Nationale has complete runs lack continuity.22 Periodicity, names, 
or content when available leave us to suspect that most participated in 
racketeering operations before going dormant until they were resurrected 
by the same director or a friend under the same guise or in a slightly 
different reincarnation (same address but modified name or vice versa). 
With no pun intended, they only existed “on paper!”  
 The difference between newspaper demographics in London and Paris 
comes from differences in libel law. With weak libel law, there was a 
greater benefit in France to engage in badmouthing rackets. Therefore, 
one benchmark estimate of the number of newspapers that would have 
existed in Paris under a counterfactual scenario of tighter libel law in 
France may be provided by comparison with London. It is unclear how 
many finance and economics newspapers are needed, but 50 to 80 
newspapers in London hardly stifled Britain’s economic development. 
Figure 1 thus provides a suggestive lower bound for the number of 
newspapers that existed mainly as instruments of rackets. In 1900 Paris 
had 250 of these, a large number.23
Examples of Badmouthing 
 Two examples help define badmouthing. A famous instance of the 
badmouthing racket involved a Russian government representative in 
Paris (Arthur Raffalovich). His correspondence was published in the 
1920s by the French Communist Party’s newspaper L’humanité (with help 
from the Soviets). It shows that the French press had extracted substantial 
fees from the Czarist regime as it sought financing during and after the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05. At the war’s outset, Russia’s had a 
moderate debt, an impeccable record for paying coupons—financially 
speaking, there was not much to report upon, except that Russia’s finances 
were of “first order.”24 But Russia was involved in a difficult war, and its 
government knew it would need foreign markets to raise resources. Since 
22 For instance, a “weekly” paper might not be published every week, and number 12 could 
appear several months after number 11. In the first semester of 1909 the weekly Moniteur des 
intérêts matériels francais appeared only on March 15 and 22, the next issue was February 10, 
1910. The weekly Le messager du rentier put out 16 issues during the same period, thus failing to 
publish ten issues. 
23 This is a lower bound because, despite higher penalties, problems of badmouthing were 
widespread in England, too. See Trollope, Way; Duguid, Money Article; and Porter, “Trusted 
Guide.” 
24 Flandreau, “Caveat Emptor”; as Raffalovich (L’abominable vénalité, p. 407) complained in 
one letter: “we [Russia] are not in the same situation as Argentina, or Brazil.”  
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Britain had sided with Japan, Russia would have to sell new debt 
issues in Paris. Any account in the Paris press suggesting that Russia 
was “living beyond its means” or “on the “breaking point” would 
create a sensation. Moreover, Russia’s enemies were prepared to 
subsidize such rumors.25 The Raffalovich correspondence shows 
papers approaching Russian representatives in Paris. It appears that 
Russia had no choice but to forestall bad press with purchase of 
publicity and bribes. Serious papers also received money. Jean-Noël 
Jeanneney concludes that the venality of the financial press had 
demoralizing effects on journalism at large.26
 Reading the press between the lines, we can find hundreds  
of instances of badmouthing rackets: they are easily located in  
semi-periodical newspapers. Consider the example of La semaine
économique et financière, an occasional financial weekly. On January 
22 1912 this paper ran a story about the Banque Suisse et Française,
which was raising capital in Paris. The story encouraged investors to be 
cautious. No real allegation was made; rather, reference was made  
to a “troubled past” and to the bank’s being less “Swiss-French”  
than “German-French” and, in fact, “more German than French”  
(the journalist inferred this from the names of directors). In the pre- 
1914 climate, being “more German than French” was tantamount to 
being owned by the hereditary enemy. The story claimed that La
semaine—unlike other newspapers that “knew nothing but praise”—  
felt “compelled” to forewarn readers and that one “could never be  
too prudent.” The article concluded with an ominous warning of  
more details to come. The publisher was exploiting the libel law’s 
“loophole”: published statements were literally true and hid the racket 
behind Article 35. The paper never published any “further details”; 
whether the prey did or did not cough we cannot be sure. 
 These cases share several features. First, the rumor is cheap because it 
does not require any investment in information. Second, a rumor is started 
precisely when the target is about to need capital market access (to finance 
a war or to fund a capital increase). Finally, each allegation enjoys 
“defense of truth” immunity because they are literally “true” and target 
managers: Russians were actually attacked by Japan and lost part of their 
fleet; and Swiss German names do sound German. 
25 These enemies included outside political rivals (such as Germany), domestic opponents to the 
czar’s autocratic rule, and international lobbies trying to protect oppressed Jewish minorities (see 
Miliukov, Russia and Its Crisis).
26 Jeanneney, “La vénalité.” 
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Payments, Intermediaries, and Participants 
 Journalists were paid off in many ways, and the law was no obstacle. 
Some financial journalists received monthly stipends, others stock 
options.27 Publishers could be pacified by buying space in newspapers 
for instance by publishing long columns of technical information 
(for example, results of the drawings of bonds for amortization). During 
1905/06 Le rentier devoted about two pages (out of sixteen) to 
information on Russian bonds—all paid for by Russian authorities.28
Similarly, banks had details of their services, deposit rates, provision of 
safes, or minutes of their board meeting published in newspapers. 
Archives provide proof of interest-free loans to publishers that were never 
reimbursed.29
 The evidence suggests that every newspaper was involved in one way 
or another. It also suggests that an entrepreneur about to launch a new 
project could expect the visit of individuals offering “help”—thinly 
disguised badmouthing threats. It also seems that different newspapers 
relied on different racketeering techniques. Papers with a relatively high 
reputation were mollified with purchases of advertisement space, and 
Lysis actually calls publicity a “gentlemanly form of racket.”30 Outright 
threats of badmouthing were made by journalist-thugs who having found a 
rumor and prey, could turn to printers who offered ready-made four-page 
papers with news taken from a variety of open sources.31 These could be 
had at a cost close to the price of the paper on which they were printed. 
The racketeer would provide the information for the front page and a 
“newspaper” was born: all that was left was to hawk it in the street. 
 Contemporaries give the impression that financial gossip was well 
organized. It had its market place. Rumors were traded in a known spot, 
under a colonnade on the side of the Paris Bourse, colloquially known as 
the Académie de Chant (in English, the badmouthing academy).32 There 
even existed racket intermediaries who could be called upon by the target 
27 For stipends, see Marinitsch, La bourse, p. 296; Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, p. 62; and 
Leroy-Beaulieu, L’art, p. 254. For stock options, see Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, p. 51; and 
D’Avenel, “Le mécanisme,” p. 643.
28 Authors’ own estimates. 
29 A file (box B3323) in the archives of the Société Générale indicates that it made a loan to 
M. Chavanon, director of L’information. A few years later, when the department for judicial 
affairs tried to secure reimbursement, Chavanon simply ignored the request. Documents show 
that the bank manager ordered the lawyers to stop asking for repayment, which suggests that 
Chavanon had paid a visit to the bank’s management. 
30 Lysis, Contre l’oligarchie financière, p. 48. 
31 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses.
32 Ibid., p. 53 
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prey to distribute monies.33 Even though major borrowers or banks 
and major press outlets could have settled directly, many payments to 
the press were managed by agents de publicité financière (advertising 
brokers). No study was ever made of these brokers, and they have left no 
archives. However, they were monitored by the police whose archives 
contain interesting (albeit limited) material.34 They also appear in 
the records of banks and newspapers. Secondary accounts suggest 
that publicity brokers centralized the distribution of bribes, in this world 
of unwritten contracts.35
 That the police monitored but did not interfere implies that the 
executive branch of government gave tacit support to this arrangement. 
In fact, government officials were sometimes found among racketeers. 
Moreover, the press was a vehicle for laundering bribes: compelling a 
target to buy ads in a newspaper was legal, whereas payments without 
counterpart services were not.36 Antoine Lefébure remarks that tax 
inspectors who came across “publicity” or “press” expenses “smiled and 
moved on.”37 This, he indicates, means that bureaucrats refused digging 
too deeply to avoid the risk of discovering disguised payments to the 
executive. In the Russian case we saw earlier, Raffalovich was first 
approached by the head of the Paris Bourse and then called by senior staff 
from the finance ministry. Senior members of the stock exchange tried to 
influence Raffalovich’s list of newspapers to be bribed. One can surmise 
that they advocated for clients and political friends. There is also evidence 
that senior politicians instructed the Russians to pay certain papers, 
who then used the bribe monies to buy votes in parliament.38 Finally, 
Lysis claims that publicity brokers fulfilled an “important social function” 
because they had tight connections with politicians. 
BADMOUTHING IN THEORY 
 Badmouthing has not been well analyzed by formal models. In what 
follows, theoretical concepts are used in a pragmatic way. They are 
adapted to context and adjusted to guide the narrative. We want to develop 
analytic inferences useful to organizing data in the next section. Our 
starting point is the stylized fact that liberalization of speech in the 1870s 
33 Ibid., pp. 54ff; and Marinitsch, La bourse, pp. 292–96. 
34 More detail can be found in the French National Archives (F/7/12842; Société Générale 
des Annonces, report 30 May 1914). 
35 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses; and D’Avenel, “Le mécanisme,” p. 642. 
36 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, pp. 59–62. See Ellschot, Lijmen, for a novel describing this 
mechanism in 1920s Flanders. 
37 Lefébure, Havas, p. 211. 
38 Raffalovich, L’abominable vénalité; and Ageron, “La vénalité de la presse française.” 
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and its consolidation by the landmark law of 1881 coincided with a 
dramatic increase in the number of newspapers. Reducing entry costs and 
deterring libel suits encouraged the entry of low quality papers: in other 
words, the value of the badmouthing option increased. Owning a bad 
newspaper was like owning a claim on those states of the world when and 
where racketeering paid.39
 The resulting situation amounts to a lemons problem.40 Readers 
understand that many of the papers published are of poor quality and 
they have trouble telling the badmouthing ones from the rest. Therefore 
readers are not prepared to pay much for newsprint. Papers willing  
to produce high-quality information are the ones that face a loss.  
One equilibrium outcome is that only low-quality papers appear. The 
alternative is that good papers can signal their worth and commit to 
maintaining their quality.  
 The issues of reputation and signals are central. Carl Shapiro 
suggested high-quality sellers would invest in reputation by behaving 
well and this would make it costly for them to cheat the public.  
The reason is that cheating would destroy the earlier investment in 
reputation.41 Following this, a large theoretical literature has analyzed 
when and how high- and low-quality products may coexist. One key 
element is that, beyond patience (for only patient sellers will invest in 
quality) market share matters. Indeed agents with a larger market share 
have more to lose, other things being equal.42
 The seller who invests in quality must be able to tell his customers he 
has done so. As Michael Spence showed, the signals need not be perfect. 
As long as the signal is positively correlated with quality, the investment 
in quality has value and is associated with higher equilibrium prices.43
Another type of signal studied in the literature is publicity. Phillip Nelson 
study of “experience goods” explores what happens when quality can be 
assessed only after purchase. He argues that publicity for such goods 
signals a quality product because only quality products will generate 
(through future purchases) the kind of revenues that warrant publicity 
expenditure in the first place.44
39 Lajeune-Vilar (Les coulisses, p. 53) cites the decline of entry costs and the increase in 
financial optimism as reasons for the association between the 1881 crisis and the boom in 
newsprint.
40 Akerlof, “Market for ‘Lemons’.” 
41 Shapiro, “Returns to Reputations.” 
42 Diamond, “Reputation Acquisition”; and Gorton, “Reputation Formation.” 
43 Spence “Job Market Signaling.” 
44 Nelson, “Consumer Behavior” and “Advertising as Information.” 
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An Intuitive Model 
These insights help explain the equilibrium coexistence of newspapers 
of high and low quality and why badmouthing may have had a limited 
reach. Good, reliable papers were supported by the rents and other 
features they earned from their investment in quality. For such papers, 
the short-term benefits from racketeering are less than the long-run  
cost of brand damage. In other words, reputation concerns prevented 
papers with a name from overt badmouthing (saying bad things about 
good concerns). If they circulated views that could later be exposed 
as wrongful, they would destroy their own reputations and face the 
consequent pecuniary losses.45
 The same logic leads ordinary newspapers to make different choices. 
They do not have a reputation and as a result they are prepared to  
try to “fool” consumers (readers) to extract money from preys. Since 
racketeering is free entry, the equilibrium condition is that the wage 
opportunity cost of racketeering equals the expected gain from the 
badmouthing racket. France’s liberal libel regime spawned an army of 
fly-by-night papers who are only printed when an opportunity for 
badmouthing materializes. We will call such newspapers “zombies” for 
they come to life only to serve the racketeers. Thus, papers with the 
greatest capacity to circulate rumors (because they have a regular 
readership and credibility) are also the least inclined to engage in 
racketeering for fear of losing their readers. This, we argue is what, as a 
first approximation, takes care of badmouthing.46 But there are other 
interesting theoretical issues.  
 While established papers have limited incentive to lie (being found out 
would cost them money), they nonetheless have some leverage over 
issuers, because they are valuable information outlets. Reliable press 
outlets can induce issuers to pay by making no mention of them.47 To 
avoid the silence firms will pay to secure coverage by a reliable paper. A 
reliable paper could have charged for printing an opinion, as rating 
agencies do nowadays, or it could have required the issuer to buy 
advertising space. Both options are consistent with the view that reliable 
45 This hypothesis has been questioned in experimental settings, but economic historians have 
ascertained that mistrust in one’s newspaper may lead to voting against that newspaper’s 
recommendations (Bloch, L’Etrange défaite, p. 163). 
46 Note that this also implies that good newspapers have an incentive in bad newspapers being 
aggressive, since this generates revenue. And since good newspapers have a dominant market 
position, they can actually subsidize badmouthing. 
47 For example, one financial newspaper (Messager de Paris) told readers that they ought to 
“read between [the] lines” and understand that in some cases “no report is equivalent to a 
forceful blame”; quoted in Albert, “La presse française,” p. 172. Bignon and Miscio, “Media 
Bias,” report evidence of information suppression. 
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certification is a scarce resource. It implies that the ability to charge 
readers and the ability to charge issuers are complements. Indeed, buying 
ads in a good paper ensures the publisher’s loyalty to the firm. There is a 
thin line between this and the rating agency racket described above and 
we think of our analysis as providing theoretical motivation for rating 
agencies’ “issuer pays” model. An interesting aspect of this mechanism is 
the windfall it creates: potential targets use ads to protect themselves 
individually. In aggregate, this provides resources to the reliable 
newspaper and creates a natural barrier against zombies. 
 A second set of insights comes from two-sided market models. These 
theories explore situations in which “platforms” court two (or more) 
parties that use the platform to interact with each other. For instance, the 
paper (the platform) reports financial information on firms (one party), 
and investors (the other party) use that information to place their money. 
The platform chooses what each party pays so that everyone participates. 
Attracting many agents on one side of the market increases what agents on 
the other side are willing to pay.48 These models also consider competition 
between platforms. A critical requirement for efficiency is that there be 
enough competition between platforms in order to prevent rent extraction. 
In other words, free entry in the market for news is of utmost importance. 
At the same time, we have seen that the reliable papers can never be fully 
competitive (investments in reputation are sunk costs) and they must 
therefore extract some rents. 
 In this light, the proper way for a firm to deal with threats of 
badmouthing would seem to be to buy advertising space in enough 
reliable papers and ignore the zombies. However, preys had limited 
knowledge of the quality of each paper. With close to 300 financial 
journals in addition to the political press, it was difficult for a 
nonspecialist to sift for serious newspapers. An issuer had to respond 
correctly when a journalist came knocking (whether to kick him out or to 
cough up) and only a specialist could gauge each and avoid the costs of 
misjudging papers. Beyond information asymmetries, we have contagion. 
Exploiting an already existing rumor could make rackets more successful. 
According to André Lajeune-Vilar: “In the Paris press, when one or 
two papers start a campaign all others follow suit the day after.”49
The externality might have sustained the trading of rumors under the 
colonnade of the Bourse where zombie predators organized campaigns. 
Last, there was the problem of monitoring, that is, making sure that bribed 
newspapers (of high or low quality) held up their end of the bargain.50
48 Rochet and Tirole, “Two-Sided Markets.” 
49 Les coulisses, p. 76. 
50 We mentioned stock options earlier. Their traction is that they are self-enforcing. Because 
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 Large, repeat issuers could find it worthwhile to develop their own 
expertise, but most firms could not do so. The market needed agents 
who could monitor the newspapers. The problem was one of limited 
enforcement (because of the Law of 1881).51 Typically when the law 
provides no remedy for nonperformance, a buyer (prey) needs to be  
sure that the seller (newspaper) will not cheat on the contract. In  
our badmouthing problem, we expect intermediaries would arise to 
coordinate the payment of bribes and to see to it that newspapers 
implement their end of the informal contract.  
Some Inferences 
 Our theoretical tour yields four important “predictions”: (1) 
Newspapers with longer horizons invest in quality which we take to  
be reliability. They make greater efforts to secure a reputation, have 
probably a greater capital, etc. and as a result, they are expected to 
charge readers more: we expect to find a significant positive correlation 
between financial newspaper price and longevity; (2) Reputable papers 
extract more revenue both from information seekers (readers) and from 
information providers (firms). Relative to unreliable/bad newspapers, 
they charge higher prices to their readers, and they generate larger 
advertising revenues; (3) Information intermediaries should emerge. 
The reason is commitment problems for both good and bad 
journals. Those intermediaries discipline badmouthing and non-
mouthing activities with a system of intertemporal rewards and 
punishments and in order to perform this duty efficiently, we predict 
they must be few and stable; and (4) Payments to newspapers are more 
likely (or they happen more often) when the prey is in a more 
“sensitive” situation (public offerings, starting of a new business, etc.). 
This is because, other things being equal, the risk (and cost) of adverse 
publicity is highest (for preys) while, the risk (and cost) that 
badmouthing be discovered is reduced (for predators).52
revenue from stock options is linked to price performance, stock options committed journalists 
to deliver. However, results did not relate directly to a single journalist’s behavior unlike the 
mechanism we describe. 
51 There is a connection between this and Diego Gambetta’s analysis of the mafia as 
providing protection services on lemons’ type of market; see Gambetta, Sicilian Mafia. 
Likewise, the role of the time horizon in limiting predation in our analysis has resemblance with 
classic models such as Olson’s “Stationary Bandit”; and Olson and McGuire, “Economics of 
Autocracy.” See Olson, Power and Prosperity.
52 This means that not only bad newspapers but also reliable ones have a greater incentive to 
provide adverse coverage. See, for instance, Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, “Ratings Game.” 
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 In summary, we argue that informal press institutions contained 
badmouthing within limits that protected the financial market’s 
operation. While we recognize that each of the four predictions we 
made are consistent with a number of possible theories, we believe that 
their joint validity is supportive evidence for our analytical narrative. 
EVIDENCE: HOW WAS BADMOUTHING SUBDUED 
Reputable Newspapers Live Longer and Charge Readers 
 To measure quality, we focus on price. This is consistent with modern 
signaling theory.53 Contemporary observers found that the “8 or 9” more 
serious finance papers were “expensive” because they were produced by 
“well-known and competent economists whose talent is expensive.”54
Journals boasted the names of competent writers. Thus, the relation we 
expect is between a journal’s time horizon and its price. 
 Time horizon is measured as incidence rate (share of years when a 
paper appeared at least once). The data come from the 242 financial 
publications listed under “finance” in the 1904 edition of the Annuaire de 
la presse.55 That year was near the middle of the period when the number 
of newspapers was greatest. For each paper published in 1904, we 
collected price per issue and years since initial publication. We chose 
price per issue because subscription rates are not comparable across 
newspapers. We standardized revenue per customer to its weekly value 
because most newspapers in this group were weekly. Practically, we 
multiplied the prices of dailies by six (the number of publication days 
per week), the prices of the fortnightly were divided by two, and so on; 
124 newspapers did not have proper prices and so were excluded, leaving
53 Our result is robust to other measures of quality. While circulation is not a feasible measure 
(circulation was not properly documented at the time, in particular no reliable circulation figures 
existed for commerce and finance papers) indirect checks exist. As shown later, Raffalovich’s 
choice of reliables shows a preference for pricey journals (Figure 4). Another measure is the 
thickness of the newspaper. We saw that ghost journals were four-page sheet and cost little. For 
example, in 1909, La bourse pour tous, obviously a ghost, did cost 10 cents. For a similar 
format, L’économiste français (perhaps the market leader for quality) had between 36 and 40 
pages and did cost 90 cents. We are entirely confident that a systematic cross section of price 
and volume of content would yield the expected result. 
54 Lajeune-Vilar (Les coulisses, p. 51). Lajeune-Vilar mentions Le messager de Paris,
L’économiste français, and Le capitaliste as reliables. On cheap unreliable newspapers, see 
Moron, Journaux financiers à bon marché; and Soreph, Défends ton argent, p. 54. 
55 D’Avenel, Annuaire. For simplicity, we limited ourselves to newspapers listed under 
“finance” (thus leaving aside the smaller “political economy”) as it includes the vast majority of 
finance and economic newspapers. 
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118 newspapers in our sample.56 Interestingly, we found newspapers for 
which there is no price information to be more ephemeral.57 This suggests 
that these were mostly zombies, so that including them in the analysis as 
“free” newspapers would only strengthen results. 
 The period during which each journal was around was computed as 
follows:58 For each title of the 770 different newspapers in operation for 
at least one year between 1890 and 1914, we created an entry. Date of 
creation was collected as reported by the source. For 108 newspapers, 
date of creation was not reported. For those, we used instead the first 
year of appearance of the paper in the Annuaire.59 Construction of this 
data is painstaking because zombies tended to disappear and reappear. 
Moreover, they often counterfeited the title of a reliable paper.60 But once 
this is done, computation of incidence rates is straightforward. The 
denominator is the number of years at risk which is at most 17 
(the sampled years between 1890 and 1914) but is less for a paper founded 
after 1890 (14 for a paper created 1895). Newspapers were then sorted by 
incidence categories (those appearing in 20 percent of the years, those 
appearing during 20–40 percent of the years, and so on). 
 Looking at numbers of newspapers in each category, it is clear that 
there was an army of less reliable newspapers, each with little credibility 
and no concern about retaining it, and a much narrower group of longer-
lived, expensive newspapers. The sheer proportion of more occasional 
titles is striking: 86 percent of all newspapers had an incidence rate lower 
than 80 percent.61 In the 1904 cross section, there are only 8 newspapers 
in the high-longevity group (in operation during 80–100 percent of the 
time) against 49 in 0–20 percent category and 61 in the 20–80 percent 
category. This is consistent with our argument that France’s financial 
press mostly comprised vehicles for racketeering.  
56 Two newspapers have a price well above the others’ (at 3 and 4 francs per issue), which 
may be a typo. In order not to bias the computation, they are excluded from the sample.  
57 The average lifetime of no price newspapers was significantly shorter than the average 
population. The hypothesis of equality of average life for price and no-price newspapers is 
rejected at 5 percent (t-stat of 3.298).  
58 We examined 1890, 1892, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898, 1899, 1900, 1901, 1904/05, 
1907, 1908, 1910, 1911, 1912, and 1914.  
59 For each year examined and each paper entry, we reported 1 or 0 depending on whether it 
was published or not. 
60 For instance, La semaine économique et financière (the zombie mentioned in Section I) 
resembled La semaine financière, a leading reliable paper. 
61 Comparison with London underscores the difference between the two places shown in 
Figure 1: there only 66 percent of newspapers had an incidence rate lower than 80 percent in the 
same year. 
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FIGURE 2
PRICE AND TIME HORIZON 
Source: Authors’ computations, from Mermet, Annuaire de la Presse. See the text.  
The price data was then matched with the incidence rates thus 
constructed. Figure 2 shows the average price per incidence group and  
it shows that incidence is related to price. Short-lived newspapers  
(in operation during less than 20 percent of the years) sold, on average, 
for about 0.10 French francs each; whereas long-lived newspapers (in 
operation 80–100 percent of the years) sold for an average price that was 
three times as high. This evidence supports the view that a newspaper’s 
time horizon and its quality match one another.62
Reputable Newspapers Attract More Publicity 
We now move one step further and show that reliable papers were  
not only able to charge readers, but also to attract more income from 
62 Results are robust to changes in benchmark years. For instance, we experienced 
with previous years such as 1899 or 1900 and found similar results. In the later part of the 
period (in 1907 or 1912 for example), however, the average price of the ephemeral or newly 
created newspapers (those in the 0–20 percent category) increased. This is consistent with 
the fact that contemporaries had been warning consumers to beware of cheap newspapers 
(for example, Soreph, Défends ton argent, p. 55). In turn, directors of zombies posted higher 
prices. In a world where price signals quality, even newspapers that are not actually sold have 
an incentive to post prices similar to those of good newspapers. It seems this practice became 
more prevalent over time. 
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publicity. Empirically, the hypothesis we want to test is whether there is 
a positive correlation between price (an indicator of quality) and gross 
advertising revenues, meaning that good newspapers can extract more 
revenues from both ends. Estimating advertising revenues is not easy, 
because financial newspapers did not generally publish accounts and 
have left no archives. Using contemporary opinion, we selected eight 
financial newspapers “representative” of different quality grades.63
Next, we picked 1909, a year when complete collections of each of 
these newspapers could be found in libraries providing knowledge of 
price-per-issue details and advertising schedules.64 Then, we measured 
the actual number of lines of advertising for each publication  
date during the first half of 1909. We included all kinds of 
advertisement: among others, lists of serial numbers of bonds drawn for 
reimbursement, as well as minutes of the meetings by shareholders of 
joint stock banks and nonfinancial companies.65 Because advertisement 
was bought at a fixed price per line, gross revenues are simply the 
number of lines multiplied by the price of advertising.66
 We now look at the correlation between price and advertising 
revenues (Figure 3). The result suggests that reliable papers (measured 
by price), which we know had the greatest longevity, also attracted 
more advertising revenues. We see that L’économiste français,
France’s renowned finance and economics weekly modeled after 
London’s The Economist, sold at the highest price (a price comparable, 
at market exchange rates, to that of The Economist) and was also  
the one that collected the most advertising income.67 This result was 
achieved because L’économiste francais charged on average a price per 
line 10 percent higher than the median and published 300 percent more 
lines of advertisement than its median competitor. 
 Thus the threat of badmouthing leads potential targets to support  
the high-quality press: it made sense to advertise in good newspapers  
63 Six newspapers belonged to the Annuaire’s “finance” category, and the other two (Economiste 
français and Economiste européen) were listed under “économie politique.”
64 The time cost of such measurement limited us to a few newspapers in a single year. It 
seems, however, that relative amounts of advertising were stable over time, in which case 
focusing on one year only still captures relative rankings. 
65 An interesting qualitative take away from it is that bank material, securities offerings, and 
drawings represented the overwhelming majority of publicity. 
66 One limitation of this approach is that it may overestimate true revenues (since discounts 
could be granted to large purchasers of ads). However, we suspect that this problem is limited. 
67 L’économiste français also seems to have been profitable, it was listed. The Cote Desfossés
shows that it distributed hefty dividends (for example, 180,000 francs in 1909, 200,000 in 1910, 
180,000 in 1911, and 280,000 in 1912). The dividend to paid-in capital ratio fluctuated between 
12 and 20 percent during the period.  
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FIGURE 3
ADVERTISING REVENUES AND QUALITY
(price per issue, selected newspapers) 
Source: Authors’ estimates, from journals. See Appendix online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1667521.
not only because they were credible, but also because doing so 
encouraged them to behave properly. The Raffalovich correspondence 
is consistent with this interpretation. The Russian agent explained  
that he strongly favored building relationship with the more reputable 
outlets, including regularly advertising as insurance against a rainy day. 
He argued that payments to zombies had to be fiercely contained as  
they only generated more racketeering and because it was difficult to 
have a grip on the behavior of bad newspapers after bribes had been 
paid. Checking Raffalovich’s list of “bribed” weekly and quasi-weekly 
(e.g., published every 10 days) newspapers against information on  
price (financial press), we find that the Russian government liked the 
most expensive ones (Figure 4). The average price of financial 
newspapers was 24.7 centimes in 1905. The average price of those 
Raffalovich chose to bribe was 69 centimes. Papers not chosen by 
Raffalovich came in at 22 centimes. (Numbers are computed by  
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FIGURE 4 
ARTHUR’S CHOICE: QUALITY RANKING OF FINANCIAL JOURNALS (ACCORDING 
TO PRICE PER ISSUE) AND EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN PURCHASES OF PUBLICITY 
Source: Authors, from Raffalovich, L’abominable vénalité; and D’Avenel, Annuaire 1904–05.
The 142 weekly and quasi-weekly journals without price per issue and those costing less than 
30 cents are not reported. Of these, only La semaine financière, a serious weekly, received 
publicity from Raffalovich. It cost 25 cents.
adjusting for periodicity and excluding L’avant bourse, a daily digest 
that was the only no price paper in his list). Similarly, information 
on circulation (partially available for the general political press) shows 
Russian agents’ preference for established newspapers.68 Some
historians have described this general pattern (that good newspapers too
68 On average the 14 general interest newspapers sponsored by Raffalovich sold 291,000 
issues a day while the 58 others only sold 18,000 copies. Excluding the four biggest dailies, the 
average circulation of Raffalovich’s sponsored newspapers was twice as high as those he did 
use. Circulation data are from Albert, “La presse française,” p. 296 and evidence on payments is 
from Raffalovich, L’abominable vénalité.
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received Russian money) as indicating a general “corruption” of French 
medias.69 Our analysis suggests a different, less pessimistic, conclusion. 
Indeed the facts are consistent with the “issuer pays” model that 
currently prevails in the rating industry. In particular, it may be efficient 
(from the target’s point of view) to help promote a high-quality press 
because it acts as a barrier against badmouthing threats of low-quality 
newspapers. Moreover, a large and competitive high-quality press 
is also the best way to ensure that the certification business remains 
contestable. 
Publicity Brokers as Delegated Monitors 
 Did “dealers in financial advertising” mitigate problems of 
asymmetric information, monitoring, and enforcement? They certainly 
had the required knowledge of the market for newspapers and could 
“price” each rumor and rumor monger. We further argued that the dealers 
should be big players who aggregate smaller claims and use their market 
power and longevity to implement retaliation. These claims can be 
examined despite the fragmentary evidence available.  
 A contemporary source reckons there were 19 dealers in financial 
advertising in 1909.70 Scattered secondhand accounts give a consistent 
picture of their relative size.71 The main brokers were well known. 
Observers concurred press brokers were remarkably concentrated and in 
this respect similar to mafia “bosses.” Oscar Marinitsch and Lajeune-
Vilar argue that, in the early 1890s three “godfathers” (Lafon, Batiau & 
Privat, and Lenoir) controlled the market.72 A decade later, Lysis 
makes the same claim about three principal brokers cornering the market, 
adding that the organization of press brokers was “very centralized.” 
Even in the 1930s Henri Loustalan distinguishes only “three or four” 
leading dealers in financial advertising from more general advertising 
brokers who were in charge of managing financial advertising for the 
account of a few newspapers.73 It also seems that these patterns were 
69 Jeanneney, “La vénalité.” 
70 Favre, Banques et banquiers, p. 82. 
71 Marinitsch, La bourse, pp. 292–96; Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, pp. 54ff; and Lysis, Contre 
l’oligarchie, pp. 162–63. According to Lajeune-Vilar (Les coulisses, pp. 54ff), the House of 
Rothschild (an investment bank) and Comptoir d’Escompte (a leading commercial bank) were in 
business with Lafon. Crédit Lyonnais and the Crédit Foncier (France’s biggest commercial bank 
and main mortgage bank, respectively, the latter involved in the Panama scandal) used Batiau, and 
Lenoir serviced the French government. 
72 Marinitsch, La bourse; and Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses.
73 To him, this explains the difference between the numbers of dealers in financial advertising 
found in the various annuaires and the few people that occupy a mafia boss type of position (in 
Loustalan, La publicité, p. 86).  
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remarkably persistent: in the 1890s Lajeune-Vilar reports that Lenoir was 
the agent for the French government, and ten years later, the Raffalovich 
briefs show an official from the Ministry of Finance describing Lenoir 
as “their” agent.74
 Evidence on how publicity brokerage worked reinforces the notion 
that they were an instrument for monitoring. Contemporaries suggest that 
individual targets or preys delegated to their bank the distribution of 
monies and the banks in turn dealt with a small number of publicity 
brokers to get the job done.75 At the top of the pyramid, the leading 
press brokers enjoyed considerable power and prestige. This explains 
Lysis’ description of publicity brokers as quasi-officials, on a first name 
basis with chairmen of leading financial institutions and politicians.76
 Lack of direct evidence makes it difficult to go beyond the 
conclusion that concentration gave the publicity brokers powerful 
retaliatory powers. We have not found any “smoking gun” of direct 
retaliation. There is plenty of secondhand evidence, however, that 
suggests that retaliation was the main instrument of enforcement.77 The 
behavior of the largest borrowers provides additional support for this 
view. Indeed the largest borrowers were also those with the greatest 
incentives to develop their own monitoring schemes, since they could 
more easily amortize the cost of acquiring needed expertise because they 
used the market many times. In other words, they could and should have 
been able to substitute to brokers.78 This was clearly the case of the 
Russian government which, although it did work with publicity brokers, 
74 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, pp. 54ff; and Raffalovich, L’abominable vénalité, p. 90. 
75 Lysis, Contre l’oligarchie, pp. 168–69: “On financial matters, two or three persons […] 
monopolize [the bribery of the press]”; Loustalan, La publicité, p. 86 : “The issuing banks are in 
Paris in relation with dealers in financial advertising. They are not numerous (3 to 4 on the 
market).”
76 “Publicity brokers are not poor shameful agents working in the shadow, they are officials, they 
are treated well, they receive distinctions, they represent a social function. These agents of 
corruption have close links with ministers, they have access to their office. The government gives 
them awards and medals. […] Some time ago a press corruptor offered game for lunch to his 
friends in a chateau. He had the most distinguished guests. On the table were Mr. the Minister of 
Finance, Mr. the Governor of the Bank of France, Mr. the Governor of the Crédit Foncier,
administrators of credit institutions, etc. In summary, the highest names from the financial who’s 
who came to his invitation.” Lysis, Contre l’oligarchie, pp. 162–63. 
77 See, for instance, the discussion in Leroy-Beaulieu, L’art, p. 254, which refers to the use of 
“rental” payments, spread over fairly long time periods, and which must have facilitated 
punishment and monitoring. 
78 Lajeune-Vilar, (Les coulisses, p. 54) suggests that the existence of intermediaries enabled 
preys to deal with their racketeers at arm’s length. Brokers also freed the prey from the 
“predictable and unavoidable complaints” of newspapers, some of which had political connections 
that borrowers did not want to damage. By dealing with a press broker, individual targets and 
banks were able to filter newspapers’ attempts at extracting revenue toward brokers, thereby 
saving valuable managers’ time and avoiding risks of loss of face. The Russian government, by 
contrast, may have wanted to limit their interaction with politically connected publicity brokers. 
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took advantage of its regular presence in the Paris market to develop 
its own approach to monitoring and retaliation. The Raffalovich letters 
thus provide valuable insights on what brokers were doing (he essentially 
did the same thing as the brokers). A standard arrangement was to 
make payments (for publication of such things as results of the drawings 
of bonds for amortization) conditional upon “proper behavior.” As 
Raffalovich explains: “It must be understood that [payment] will last 
‘during good behavior’ because if they cheat too openly on us, the 
minister can always become angry.”79 There are cases when the minister 
or Raffalovich actually got angry and discontinued payments.80
Vulnerability and Bribes: Public Offerings and Badmouthing 
 In the previous section, we suggested that there should be a 
connection between badmouthing and public offerings. This implies that, 
the larger the offering, the greater the opportunities for zombies—a 
kind of predator-prey relation. This notion is supported by abundant 
contemporary statements. Lajeune-Vilar mentions the connection and 
other writers brought it up repeatedly afterwards.81 Alfred Neymarck, an 
economist and the director of a leading financial newspaper (Le rentier), 
describes the promotion of public offerings in newspapers through 
advertisements, paid articles, and distribution of stock options as part of 
the normal process “in France and abroad.”82 Lysis gives examples: the 
Bank of France increased its payments (“rations”) when its charter had to 
be renewed; Banks made payments every time they placed a security in 
the public. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu (the editor of L'économiste français) also 
explains that security issues were always associated with payments to the 
press. A 1909 article in Le globe goes further and gives details about 
specific schemes.83
 Contemporary insiders and critics thus agree with our prediction 
that vulnerability should be associated with securities offerings. 
Some data can be used to confirm this. The hypothesis is that free entry 
in the badmouthing trade combined with the absence of fixed costs  
in organizing rackets implies that the volume of potential targets 
(measured by the volume of securities offerings on the market)  
79 Raffalovich, L’abominable vénalité, p. 187. 
80 Ibid., p. 197; Actual retaliation occurred against Le messager de Paris and La patrie in 1908. 
81 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, pp. 33–34. 
82 Neymarck, Finances contemporaines, pp. 63–64, 66. 
83 Lysis, Contre l’oligarchie, pp. 168–69; Leroy-Beaulieu, L’art, pp. 251–54; and Le globe, 11 
November 1909, 858. 
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FIGURE 5
NUMBER OF FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS AND IPO 
VOLUMES IN PARIS  
(1892–1913)
Source: Newspapers: Authors. Securities publicly issued in Paris from Saul (“Banking 
Alliances,” p. 122, stock publicly issued in France) citing Chadeau, L’économie nationale au 
19ème siècle) and the INSEE statistical yearbook (1951, 1961, and 1966). Nominal values were 
deflated using the index of Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, L’économie française.
should be positively related to the number of fly-by-night newspapers 
entering in the Annuaire. Figure 5 plots the number of financial 
newspapers from the Annuaire against securities offerings values in 
Paris from 1892 to 1913 deflated with Maurice Lévy-Leboyer  
and François Bourguignon’s price index.84 The chart shows the 
correlation is large and it is significant. 
 We can perform a finer test by examining if there is a dynamic 
connection between the two series. Stock market booms provided 
abundant racketing opportunities: increases in public offerings should 
have led to increases in the number of bad journals (since badmouthing 
is competitive).85 It would be tempting to establish the correlation 
84 Saul, “Banking Alliances”; and Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, L’économie française.
85 Figure 1 offers just that evidence. We can “read” the footprints of the speculation and crisis 
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between variation of the volume of offerings and variation of the 
number of newspapers. One problem with this relation however, is  
that the Annuaire was not published annually in the early 1900s, thus 
we cannot always match variations of number of newspapers in two 
subsequent Annuaires and the number of securities offerings. 
 Instead, we explore the dynamic relation between newspapers and 
public offerings using cointegration methods. The idea of cointegration 
analysis is to capture a dynamic equilibrium relation between two 
variables; in our case, the relation which we postulate is between 
number of newspapers and volumes of securities offered to the public. 
To do so, however, one must have a sufficiently long series of 
observations or results will not be significant. The total offerings series 
we used in Figure 5 (1892–1913) is too short (only 19 observations 
since we are missing some years when the Annuaire did not appear). 
We thus use instead Arbulu’s stock issues on the official market; it is 
substantially longer (1881–1913).86 Cointegration analysis results are 
supportive: the number of newspapers and the stock offerings series are 
cointegrated and positively related.87
THE COSTS OF BADMOUTHING 
How Much was Appropriated? 
 We now construct estimates of the “overall” revenues that the press 
(good or bad) derived from securities offerings. Revenues from offerings 
represent only a fraction of the total amounts issuers paid to the press 
because as we explained, good newspapers would attract advertising even 
if there were no new securities. Yet focusing on offerings helps evaluate 
associated with the Union Générale scandal of 1881 and the Panama Canal scandal in 1892. On 
these crises and surrounding speculation, see Simon, Panama Affair; Bouvier, Deux scandales
and Le krach; and Kindleberger, Manias, pp. 114–15. 
86 Arbulu, “Le marché parisien.” 
87 We follow the method of Engle and Granger, “Co-Integration” and use their two steps 
method of residuals-based test of cointegration. Both the series of log of the number of newspapers 
and the log of deflated IPO values are I(1). Regression of newspapers on IPO shows a positive and 
significant coefficient of the IPO variable (0.12 with a t-stat of 2.67). If the residual of the regression 
is stationary, then the inference is that the number of newspapers (in log) and the IPO value (in log) 
are cointegrated. As shown by the result of the Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (“Efficient Tests”) unit 
root test (with a value of –2.96 < –2.63 at 1 percent) and of the Ng and Perron (“Lag Length”) test 
(–11.4 < 8.1 at 5 percent), the residual is stationary. Therefore the number of newspapers and the 
volume of IPO are cointegrated. Furthermore, the series of IPO volume does Granger-causes the 
series of financial and political economy newspapers but the reverse causality is not found (Granger, 
“Investigating”). All the results are unaffected if the variables are taken in absolute numbers.
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050711001860
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 08:09:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Economics of Badmouthing 643
FIGURE 6 
RUSSIAN BRIBES AND PUBLICITY DURING THE 1900S (FF) 
Source: Authors, from Raffalovich, L’abominable vénalité.
the amount of money that was being “wasted” as it is when we expect
zombies to have captured the biggest revenues. Figure 6 shows Russian 
government’s total payments to the press using Raffalovich’s own 
distinction between regular payments (“advertising”) and exceptional 
expenses (“bribes”). The figure is a vivid illustration of the effect we  
mentioned earlier: while advertising expenses were stable (vindicating its 
interpretation as an insurance premium) bribes were volatile. And they 
peaked between 1904 and 1906 (between the outbreak of the war with 
Japan and the eventual consolidation of Russian finances through a 1906 
security issue). Vulnerability prompted the zombie attack. 
 To construct total offerings-related expenditures on the press, we first 
estimate the average amount of money paid to the press for a security 
offering of a given value and then multiply it by the total value of 
offerings. Contemporary reports suggest that press brokers were paid 
a lump-sum fee for their service and it is this average fee we need 
to estimate.88 One source is underwriting contracts since they often 
mention payments “made to the press,” but expenses are not reported
88 Lysis, Contre l’oligarchie, pp. 162–63. Incidentally, because of payment as a lump-sum fee 
brokers lost money if payments to papers overran, and this aligned the broker’s incentives with 
that of the prey. 
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transparently.89 We took advantage of an episode when information on 
payments to the press for a few loans was divulged by the director 
general of Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (an investment bank) to the 
newspaper Le globe in 1909.90 We then matched the material printed by 
Le globe with the actual contracts which we retrieved in this bank’s 
archive, yielding high-quality data for three foreign government loans.91
 Table 1 displays information we organized from both the 
underwriting contracts and Le globe.92 The three loans are a 1899 Crédit
Foncier de Hongrie bond (obligations communales 3.5 percent), a 1902 
Bulgarian 5 percent loan, and a 1905 Brazilian (Sao Paulo) 5 percent 
loan. We examine payments to the press relative to the net amount 
raised by issuers and relative to underwriting fees. Comparison with 
amounts appropriated by bankers is relevant because beyond financial 
services (originating, marketing, distributing, and insurance services), 
they also provided signals of the issue’s quality.93 Banks “competed” 
with the press. We also document a 1906 Russian 5 percent loan that 
concluded the protracted period of “Russia bashing” started with the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904–1906). In this case, the distribution of 
monies was not indirectly related to the loan itself because the 
campaign began long before Russia decided to borrow. One reason for 
adding this loan is that Russia (unlike the other borrowers of Table 1) 
mostly dealt with zombies directly: it is informative to see whether 
large repeat issuers who had some expertise and did not delegate 
entirely to the press brokers managed to spend less. 
89 Sometimes indications are made that publicity expenditures are borne out by the underwriters 
(that is, paid out of underwriting fees to banks) and no details are given. 
90 Le globe published data for the Hungarian loan on 25 November 1909 (pp. 908–09), for the 
Bulgarian loan a week later (on 2 December 1909, pp. 930–31), and for the Sao Paulo loan on 9 
December 1909 (pp. 948–50). For comment and a discussion of the reasons for the leak, see L’écho 
des capitalistes of 9 December 1909. L’écho reported that Albert Turrettini, the new director 
general of the bank declared, “La presse, je m’en f…!” (in English, “F… the press!”). 
91 Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas archives at the BNP-Paribas in Paris. Hungary: folder BPPB 
1/CABET 1/13 and BPPB 11/DFOM-221/669; Bulgaria: folder BPPB 6/DFOM-221/61; and Sao 
Paulo: folder BPPB 11/DFOM-221/424 and 11 DFOM 221/424. 
92 The advertising expenses of the Sao Paulo loan published in Le globe (210,000 FF) require 
corrections. L’écho des capitalistes (9 December 1909) pointed the incompleteness of the list. The 
archives of the banking syndicate mention a total of 367,317 FF paid using Lenoir as press broker 
(folder 11 DFOM 221/424).  
93 Flandreau and Flores, “Bonds and Brands.” For details on underwriting fees paid to French 
banks during the period, see Flandreau et al., “End of Gatekeeping.” Their study implies that fees 
in Britain and France were roughly competitive. 
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TABLE 1 
THE COST OF BADMOUTHING: VALUE APPROPRIATED BY INTERMEDIARIES 
 Hungarian 
Mortgage 
Bank 3.5% 
1899 
Bulgaria 5% 
1902 
Sao Paulo 5% 
1905 
Russia 5% 
1906 
Date 1899 1902 1905 1904–1906 
Amount raised by borrower (M FF) (a) 17.75 86.40        34.98 (b)    1002.00 (b) 
“Bribes”     
Amount (M FF) na na  na          5.00 (c) 
Percent of amount raised na na na    0.50 
“Bribes” and “Publicity”     
Amount (M FF) 0.09 0.43 0.37 6.00 
Percent of amount raised 0.53 0.50           1.05 (d) 0.60 
Bankers’ fee     
Amount (M FF) 0.65 7.42 2.10 54.00 
Percent of amount raised 4.25 8.59 6.01 5.30 
Press as percent of Bankers’ fee 14.54           5.8 17.59 11.00 
(a) Value of issue net of Bankers’ fees, and stamp duty (not reported). 
(b) Paris share. 
(c) Three million for bribes between February 1904 and June 1906 (from Raffalovich, 
L’abominable vénalité), plus 2 million for advertising (from contract with the Russian 
government, dated April 16, 1906, Crédit Lyonnais archive). 
(d) The loan was issued by an international syndicate. The percentage reported is for Paribas’ 40 
percent share of the whole issue that was placed in Paris. 
Sources: Le globe, November 25 1909 (Hungary), December 2 1909 (Bulgaria), December 9 
1909 (Sao Paulo); BNP Paribas archives (BPPB), 1/CABET 1/13 and BPPB 11/DFOM-221/669 
(Hungary), BPPB 6/DFOM-221/61 (Bulgaria), BPPB 11/DFOM-221/424 (Sao Paulo), 
Raffalovich (L’abominable vénalité, Russia), Suzuki (Japanese Government Loan Issues);
Archive Crédit Lyonnais, Emprunt Russe 5 percent 1906, Schedule no 29.336. BPPB 5/DFOM-
221/21.
 Three features stand out. First, as a share of the capital actually 
borrowed, the amounts appropriated are relatively small: about half of 
a percentage point. Second, they also only represent 6 to 18 percent of 
underwriting fees. Most of the value resulting from certification services 
seems to have been appropriated by banks, not by the media.94 With 
the help of the press brokers, large banks must have disciplined 
badmouthing. Had it been unchecked, badmouthing would have eaten 
into banks’ margins and risked jeopardizing international competitiveness 
(thus the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas’ director general loss of 
patience as he did?) 
  The numbers for Russia are also interesting. Although the campaign 
was spread out over two and a half years, the total spent (relative to the 
94 Payments to the press were relatively large compared with modern underwriting fees for 
similar securities, which averaged 0.54 percent for issues in New York from 1993 to 2007; see 
Flandreau et al., “End of Gatekeeping.”
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FIGURE 7
IPO ADVERTISING EXPENSES FOR ISSUES IN PARIS 
Source: Securities publicly issued in Paris from Saul (“Banking Alliances,” p. 122, series stock 
publicly issued in France). The nominal values were deflated using the price index of Lévy-
Leboyer and Bourguignon, L’économie française.
value of the 1906 loan) is comparable to what we find for other deals 
where monies were paid in relation to one issue only. Russia’s campaign 
was cost effective: bigger agents who were better equipped to handle 
racketeers faced lower costs. It also explains why Raffalovich often 
advocated circumventing the publicity brokers. 
 Finally, multiplying our estimates of issue-related payments with the 
volumes of security issues enables to assess the total amounts 
appropriated by the press (Figure 7). Table 1 gives appropriations between 
0.5 percent and 0.6 percent of amounts received by borrowers. This 
represents about 0.4 to 0.5 percent of the price paid by the public (the 
public offering).95 In constant 1913 francs, annual issue-related payments 
ranged between 10 million FF (early 1900s) and about 20 million FF 
(1913).96 These are large absolute numbers; they are large when compared 
with what the Crédit Lyonnais (a leading underwriter) spent annually on 
its 100 employees research department (around 1900, 1 million FF).97
95 Sao Paulo issue left aside (1.05 percent of amount raised by borrower). The loan was issued 
jointly by Paribas and Dresdner Bank. The strong anti-German stance in France may have caused 
the high fee.  
96 The amount paid to the press sums up between 209 and 261 million of 1913 FF (between 
0.65 or 0.82 billion of 2009 euros). 
97 Flandreau, “Caveat Emptor.” 
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TABLE 2 
PAYMENTS TO RELIABLE NEWSPAPERS DURING THREE LOAN ISSUES 
Share distributed to brokers and influential periodicals  
(in percentage of the advertising budget) 
Hungarian
Mortgage
Bank
3.5% 1899 
Bulgaria
5% 1902 
Sao Paulo 
5% 1905 
Underworld (any other papers and publicity brokers)a
Quality (total influential papers, financial and general)  
Of which 
Influential political or general interest newspapersb
Among which, those with a circulation greater 
than 50,000 a day 
Among which, those with a circulation lower than 
50,000 a day 
Influential financial periodicals 
Total 
70.64 
29.36 
24.33 
    16.4 
  7.93 
  5.03 
   100
65.74 
34.26 
30.41 
17.25 
13.16 
  3.85 
  100
62.74 
38.26 
29.41 
19.81 
9.6 
  8.85 
  100
a This category is computed as the difference between the advertising budget as indicated in 
Table 1 and the money received both by the influential newspapers and by those dailies that had 
a circulation greater than 50,000 a day although they were not on Raffalovich’s list. 
b There are 7 dailies with a circulation greater than 50,000 a day and 5 with a lower circulation 
(including Le figaro and Le temps).
Sources: Le globe (November 25, December 2, and December 9, 1909); and Albert, “La presse 
Française” for the circulation numbers, influential papers from Raffalovich, L’abominable 
vénalité.
Value Diversion by Zombies 
 The information leaked by the disgruntled director of Paribas included  
a list of newspapers and intermediaries that were paid. We subtracted 
from expenses to the press what was distributed to “reliable” papers;  
the residual includes bribes to bad newspapers and press brokers’ 
commissions.98 Reliable papers were identified using Raffalovich’s list of 
serious financial and general interest newspapers.99 In Table 2, they  
are respectively identified as “influential financial newspapers” and 
“influential general newspapers.” The table then shows that between 62 
percent and 70 percent of the press budget went to zombies and brokers.100
 It is striking that although reliable papers did attract resources (through 
regular advertising payments which are not taken into account in our 
98 Lenoir was referred to as “Mr. X.” Other brokers who acted for several journals at once 
were referred to as “Régies.” 
99 L’abominable vénalité.
100 As an alternative to the Raffalovich criterion, we also identify leading general-interest dailies 
by selecting papers with a circulation greater than 50,000 in 1910 (Albert, “La presse française,” p. 
296). This category overlaps only partly with the Raffalovich list; five of the twelve papers with 
circulation of 50,000 or more a day were not paid by the Russians. Likewise, we selected the most 
expensive financial journals (50 cts or more). Computations with this alternative definition do not 
alter the finding that 60 to 70 percent of monies went to zombies.  
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securities issue payment schedules), their share barely reached 40 percent 
of press-related issue expenses. Leading financial newspapers thus 
received but a small portion, a fact that contemporary observers 
deplored.101 Within the good journals, the main recipients were the 
generalist newspapers with large circulation. This makes sense because 
their nonspecialized form enabled them both to reach a wide audience and 
to apply extensive “soft” badmouthing by ignoring certain issuers. It does 
give us pause, therefore, that relatively little money went to good research 
compared to what was thrown after the army of zombies and their mafia-
like bosses. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 This article analyzed the market for financial information in France 
before World War I. We examined how libel law, or a lack thereof, made 
reputation fragile and encouraged the creation of at least 250 “zombie” 
finance newspapers, at the turn of the century. Newspapers without a 
reputation did not hesitate to make damaging allegations. Indirect 
coordination was assisted by bandwagon effects and/or availability of a 
meeting point (the Académie de chant). Finally, rumors were more likely 
to be planted when there was a greater likelihood that others would pick it 
up and new security offerings provided good opportunities. 
 Against that, we identified two main mechanisms that mitigated the 
impact of “zombies.” First, more serious papers found their value 
in insuring securities issuers against the adverse effects of rumors. 
L’économiste français and other papers emerged as standards of 
reliability, and they benefited from stable advertising revenues. This 
finding, we argue, may explain why providers of financial information 
were able to charge the concerns they “rated”—an issue relevant to the 
renewed debate over the relations between issuers and rating agencies. 
 A second solution emerged to deal with badmouthing: coalitions 
of issuers structured by bankers (the underwriters) and the pooling 
of bribes through delegated monitors called “publicity brokers.” By 
signing up a number of (financially incompetent) people for press 
campaigns, the brokers subsidized a “party” supporting the issuers that 
had paid for it: a badmouthing paper could be paid above its opportunity 
cost. At that point, information-poor media chose not to fabricate
101 “The influential financial newspapers, those that incite the capitalists to buy stocks and bonds 
offerings, those providing financial advice that are followed by their readers and subscribers appear 
in this advertising budget for a relatively tiny amount.” L’écho des capitalistes (9 December 1909, 
no 42, 1). Le globe (9 November 1909, 858) pointed out that, “The wealth of investors feeds the 
cashbox of numerous political newspapers although their advertising is notoriously useless.”
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damaging information. Second, because of their concentration, brokers 
had the means to retaliate against deviating low-quality newspapers. 
 This scenario belonged to the world of second-best solutions. For 
the “Belle Epoque” as the era leading up to World War I is known, 
we estimated that roughly 10.5 million 1913 francs were paid annually 
in “bribes,” of which some 60 percent ended up in the pockets of 
racketeers. Although this may have been small potatoes compared to 
total issues in Paris or to the benefits that accrued to underwriters, an 
average of 235 million 1913 francs paid out during the 1892–1913 
period is large. In a better world, this money—instead of lining the 
pockets of white-collar racketeers—could have funded a higher-quality 
press. It did not. This was regretted by many, including the Russian 
financial agent Raffalovich.102 Why was it so? This is a topic for future 
research. We note that the situation did benefit the brokers, the bad 
journals, but also various brands of incumbents in politics and banking: 
they may have found it in their interest to maintain a critical level of 
badmouthing as an informational friction on which they could prey. 
It may well be that certification by newspapers (or rating agencies) 
competes against certification by banks. Recent research shows that 
during this period, underwriting banks collected large revenues from 
underwriting and certification services.103 A higher-quality press might 
well have reduced the profit margins of investment banks. Bankers may 
thus have preferred to bribe journals, and—by sustaining enough 
corruption—they depreciated the quality of their competitor’s certification 
which amounted to protecting their own—and corresponding revenues. 
 Yet there are other elements to this problem including the role of 
politicians. As has been argued before, politicians and parties were 
generally involved in the information racket. Politicians appeared at 
both ends of the game: the executive branch purchased press coverage 
for domestic loans while individual politicians could raise funds by 
running their own zombie papers because they could complicate life for 
targets. Newspapers, some of which were controlled by political parties, 
were ideal vehicles for laundering racket money, because whatever 
the end purpose bribes could be simply registered under “publicity.” 
In short, certification business could have been captured by special 
interests and to some extent it was. Ironically, a regime based on 
freedom of speech does not guarantee that the truth will come out. 
102 Raffalovich, L’abominable vénalité.
103 Flandreau et al., “End of Gatekeeping.” 
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